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INTRODUCTION
As Justice Tom Clark once said, “We cannot forgive the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment in the name of law enforcement.”1 As technology has increasingly
become a part of our everyday lives, law enforcement officials often attempt to use
the collection of metadata from technological devices, including fitness trackers such
as Fitbits, to assist in their law enforcement endeavors.2 In fact, today the government
has numerous “sophisticated ways of seeing, hearing, and tracking people, ways that
were unimaginable to the Fourth Amendment’s Framers.”3
For example, in 2015, Connie Dabate was murdered inside her home while wear-
ing a Fitbit.4 In the course of the investigation of her murder, her husband, Richard
Dabate, told investigators that several masked intruders broke into their home and
shot his wife at approximately 9:00 a.m.5 However, after police collected data from
his wife’s Fitbit, they were able to determine that her last movements inside the home
1 MIMI CLARK GRONLUND,SUPREME COURT JUSTICETOM C.CLARK:ALIFE OF SERVICE
204 (2010).
2 See, e.g., Nicholas Rondinone, Richard Dabate Rejects Plea Deal in Fitbit Murder
Case, Pushes for Trial in Wife’s Killing, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 24, 2019, 5:10 PM),
http://www.courant.com/breaking-news/hc-br-dabate-fitbit-murder-20190124-rmxjg4hwn
5egzij3cesi3dd6ki-story.html [http://perma.cc/BP26-PUGV].
3 Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter Build a Stable
Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 412.
4 Dave Altimari, All Evidence Turned over as Fitbit Murder Case Moves Toward Trial,
HARTFORD COURANT (July 20, 2018, 12:30 PM), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut
/hc-news-fit-bit-murder-dabate-trial-20180720-story.html [http://perma.cc/GE5B-V3GG].
5 Rondinone, supra note 2; Gabriella Paiella, A Dead Woman’s Fitbit Data May Lead
to Her Husband’s Murder Conviction, CUT (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.thecut.com/2017/04
/fitbit-murder-case-richard-dabate.html [http://perma.cc/9TM8-XGDT].
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were actually not until 10:05 a.m., more than an hour after her husband stated that she
had been murdered by unknown intruders.6 As a result of this information and other
circumstantial evidence,7 Richard Dabate was charged with the first-degree murder
of his wife.8
The Richard Dabate case demonstrates the potential use of Fitbit data in criminal
prosecutions. In that case, Connie Dabate’s Fitbit turned out to be the most valuable
witness in the government’s case against her husband.9 Fitbits are commonly worn
by individuals during all waking hours, and the devices track a large breadth of per-
sonal data, such as the number of steps the user takes each day, their total distance
traveled, the number of calories burned, their weight, heart rate, average sleep stages,
total active minutes, and even their location.10 This data has the potential to reveal the
intimacies of one’s life, including daily whereabouts and sensitive health informa-
tion.11 Thus, because of the popularity of these devices in our modern world, the
sensitive nature of the information stored on these devices and their potential use in
criminal investigations and prosecutions, it is imperative to determine whether the
collection of data from a Fitbit constitutes a search and, if so, whether such a search
requires a warrant.
This Note will argue that, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Carpenter v. United States, the collection of seven or more days of Fitbit data con-
stitutes a search and, as such, requires the police to obtain a warrant before collect-
ing such data.12 Part I of this Note reviews the text of the Fourth Amendment and
its requirements. Part II provides an overview the history of the Fourth Amendment
doctrine and what constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Part III analyzes
the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter and the implications of that case. Part IV
provides information regarding Fitbits, the data they store, and their potential to be
used in criminal prosecutions. Finally, Part V analyzes the Carpenter decision in the
context of the collection of data from Fitbits to argue that such a collection of data
constitutes a search and requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. It then
proposes a rule for future cases that involve determining whether the collection of
data constitutes a search.
6 Rondinone, supra note 2.
7 Altimari, supra note 4 (explaining that police gathered cellphone, text message,
Facebook, and FitBit records for Connie Dabate as well as computer records from Richard
Dabate’s laptop).
8 Paiella, supra note 5.
9 Marguerite Reardon, Your Alexa and Fitbit Can Testify Against You in Court, CNET
(Apr. 5, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/alexa-fitbit-apple-watch-pacemaker-can
-testify-against-you-in-court/ [http://perma.cc/UH48-PPUC].
10 Fitbit Privacy Policy, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/legal/privacy-policy [http://perma
.cc/GZF9-FJUA] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
11 See id.
12 See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.3 (2018).
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.13
The Fourth Amendment contains two primary requirements: the reasonableness re-
quirement and the warrant requirement.14 With respect to the reasonableness require-
ment, courts have long held that, according to the text of the Fourth Amendment, the
“ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonable-
ness.’”15 Warrantless searches are considered per se unreasonable, subject only to
a few, narrow exceptions.16
Because of the presumption under the Fourth Amendment that warrantless searches
are unreasonable, the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule to deter unlawful
police conduct and encourage law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant prior to
conducting a search of a constitutionally protected area.17 Although the exclusionary
rule is not written into the text of the Fourth Amendment itself, it has become a
foundational principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.18 Justice Alito recently
described the exclusionary rule as “a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution
from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.”19
The exclusionary rule derives its origins from Mapp v. Ohio, a 1961 Supreme
Court case involving the warrantless search of a woman’s home.20 In that case, police
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 See id.
15 William Kendall, Note, “Outrunning” the Fourth Amendment: A Functional Approach
to Searches of Wearable Fitness Tracking Devices, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 333, 339 (2019) (quoting
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)).
16 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Exceptions to the warrant requirement
include searches conducted pursuant to consent, incident to a lawful arrest, pursuant to exigent
circumstances (such as an imminent risk of destruction of evidence, an imminent danger to
the community, or the hot pursuit of a suspect), and searches of objects in plain view. See
Fourth Amendment, LEGAL INFO.INST.,http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment
[http://perma.cc/BG96-8VLU] (June 2017).
17 See Alexandra Carthew, Comment, Searches and Seizures—Fourth Amendment and
Reasonableness in General: Protection of Privacy Interests in the Digital Age, 94 N.D. L.
REV. 197, 200–01 (2019).
18 See id. at 200.
19 Id. at 201 (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231–32 (2011)).
20 See 367 U.S. 643, 644–45 (1961).
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arrived at Mapp’s home in search of a suspect they believed was hiding inside.21 When
Mapp answered the door, she requested the police produce a warrant before she
permitted them entry into the home.22 The officers produced a piece of paper, which
they handed to Mapp, and then proceeded to search the home, where they found and
seized pornography.23 Later, it was revealed that the piece of paper that officers had
shown Mapp was not, in fact, a valid warrant, and, as such, the pornography seized
was the result of an unlawful, warrantless search.24 On appeal, the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary rule applied to the states through the incorporation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus, all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is inadmissible in state court.25
Together, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and the court-
created exclusionary rule mean that any evidence obtained from a warrantless search
cannot be used in a criminal prosecution.26 Because of the importance of this default
rule in determining the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials, this Note next
examines what constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment in order to clarify
when the warrant requirement applies.
II. HISTORY OF THE “SEARCH” DOCTRINE
A. The Olmstead Trespassory Doctrine
Originally, the Fourth Amendment was understood to protect against only a physi-
cal trespass by a person into a constitutionally protected area.27 In Olmstead v. United
States, a 1928 Supreme Court case, the Court considered a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to evidence that was obtained via a wiretap.28 In that case, Olmstead and his co-
defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate the federal prohibition laws that
21 Id. at 644.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 644–45.
24 Id. at 645.
25 Id. at 655.
26 See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). The Olmstead Court stated:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal de-
cisions . . . hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as
against a defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure
of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material
effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house “or curtilage” for
the purpose of making a seizure.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Eunice Park, Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter:
Extending the Third-Party Doctrine Beyond CSLI: A Consideration of IoT and DNA, 21
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2019).
28 277 U.S. at 455–66.
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were still in force at that time.29 Wiretaps of the alleged conspirators’ telephone
conversations were the government’s primary evidence used to establish the exis-
tence of the conspiracy.30 The question before the Court was whether the use of wire
tapping to obtain defendants’ private telephone conversations constituted a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.31 The Court held that the wiretap was not a Fourth
Amendment violation, explaining that such a violation could not exist without an
actual search or seizure of a person or their material effects, or a physical invasion
of a person’s home.32 Thus, because the wiretap was conducted without a physical
trespass by the government, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s protections
were inapplicable.33
B. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment remained closely
related to concepts of property law until 1967, when the Olmstead trespassory doctrine
was overruled by Katz v. United States.34 Katz expanded the protection of the Fourth
Amendment beyond merely guarding against physical intrusions.35 Since then, the
Supreme Court has continuously recognized a more expansive view of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections, encompassing not only the right to be free from physical
trespass, but also the right to individual privacy.36
In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a
public telephone booth.37 When Katz entered the phone booth, the device was used
to record his conversation.38 As a result of the wiretap, Katz was convicted under an
eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting illegal wagering information
via telephone.39 Both the district court and the court of appeals found that there had
been no Fourth Amendment violation because the agents had not physically entered
the phone booth, and, under Olmstead, absent a physical trespass, there could be no
constitutional violation.40 The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower
courts, reasoning that even though there had been no physical trespass, a person who
enters a telephone booth and shuts the door behind him has a reasonable expectation
29 Id. at 456–57.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 455.
32 Id. at 466.
33 Id.
34 See 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
35 Carthew, supra note 17, at 201.
36 See id.; Park, supra note 27, at 8.
37 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 348–49.
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that his communications would not be broadcast to the world, and such an expecta-
tion of privacy is protected under the Fourth Amendment.41 As such, the Court held
that the wiretap constituted a violation of Katz’s Fourth Amendment protections.42
This more expansive view of Fourth Amendment coverage produced what has
come to be known as the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.43 The actual
test is articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz.44 The test is com-
prised of two unique, but related, requirements: “[F]irst[,] that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”45 The Court also noted that
once a reasonable expectation of privacy has been established, the burden then shifts
to the government to justify the warrantless search.46 The Court reasoned that “[w]hat
a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection[,] [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”47 Thus, the Supreme Court over-
ruled the narrower Olmstead trespassory doctrine in favor of the idea that the Fourth
Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but also extends to the
recording of oral statements, overheard without any physical trespass.48
C. The Third-Party Doctrine
Although the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test represents a relatively
expansive view of Fourth Amendment protections, one notable limitation on such
protection is the third-party doctrine.49 According to this doctrine, the Fourth Amend-
ment does not prohibit the government from obtaining information that an individual
conveys to a third party, even if that information was originally given to the third
41 Id. at 352. The Court stated:
One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.
Id.
42 Id. at 353.
43 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 357 (majority opinion).
47 Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
48 See id. at 353. In United States v. Jones, the Court clarified that the Katz reasonable-
ness test is not the exclusive test for determining Fourth Amendment violations. 565 U.S. 400,
411–12 (2012). Rather, the Court noted that it may better be understood as supplementing
the default rule that when a classic, physical trespass is present, a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation has occurred. See id.
49 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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party with the assumption that it would only be used for a limited purpose and that
it would not be exposed to others.50
The third-party doctrine originated in United States v. Miller, a Supreme Court
case in which a defendant was convicted for operating an undocumented whiskey
distillery in Georgia.51 During their investigation of the case, the government obtained
copies of checks and other financial records belonging to the defendant without a war-
rant.52 However, the Court held that Miller had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in the checks or financial records, as he had voluntarily conveyed this information
to the bank and its employees—a third party.53
The Supreme Court later affirmed its reasoning from Miller in Smith v. Maryland.54
In that case, a robbery victim called the police and reported that a man, identifying
himself as the robber, had made numerous threatening phone calls to her in the days
following the robbery.55 During one of these calls, the man told the victim to step
outside, and when the victim did so, she saw the man driving slowly past her home.56
The government used the victim’s reports to trace the license plate number of the
robber’s vehicle to a man named Michael Smith.57 Subsequently, the government,
without obtaining a warrant for Smith’s phone records, directed Smith’s telephone
company to install a pen register that would record the numbers Smith dialed from
his home.58 The pen register revealed that Smith was in fact calling the victim.59 Using
this information, the government secured a search warrant for Smith’s home that
revealed evidence of the robbery.60
The result of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Smith and Miller is a bright-line
rule that an individual “has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”61 Accordingly, “the Government is typically
free to obtain such information from [the third party] without triggering Fourth
50 Id.
51 Id. at 436–39.
52 Id.
53 See id. at 440, 442.
54 See generally 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
55 Id. at 737.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. A pen register is a mechanical device that can be installed on a landline telephone
to record the outgoing phone numbers dialed on the landline “by monitoring the electronic
impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released.” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434
U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977). The device is not capable of recording the content of the communi-
cations via telephone, nor does it indicate whether the calls placed were actually completed. Id.
59 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
60 Id. (The search of Smith’s home revealed that a page in his phone book was turned
down to the name and number of Patricia McDonough, the victim of the robbery. Police seized
the phone book, and Smith was later indicted for robbery.).
61 Id. at 743–44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976)).
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Amendment protections.”62 This rule rests on two main justifications. “[F]irst, since
business records are not confidential communications, [a] defendant can ‘assert neither
ownership nor possession’” over such records.63 Second, a defendant who volun-
tarily exposes or shares private information with another person or entity thereby
forgoes any expectation of privacy he might have claimed in that information.64
Thus, the Supreme Court’s doctrine regarding Fourth Amendment protections
suggests that a person who has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular place
or thing must be protected against warrantless governmental searches, unless they have
voluntarily exposed their private materials to a third party.65 Until recently, this rule has
governed all searches, regardless of the nature of the place or thing to be searched.66
III. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
In 2018, the Supreme Court once again addressed the limits of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protections in Carpenter v. United States.67 In that case, police officers arrested
four men who were suspected of robbing several RadioShack and T-Mobile stores
between 2010 and 2012.68 After one of the suspects confessed to committing the
string of robberies, prosecutors obtained a court order under the Stored Communica-
tions Act to obtain the cell phone records of Carpenter.69 Using this order, the FBI
obtained 127 days of Carpenter’s cell phone records, including the cell site location
information (CSLI) for Carpenter over a four-month period.70 The CSLI included
62 Park, supra note 27, at 5 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216
(2018)).
63 Id. at 11–12 (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216).
64 Id. at 12.
65 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (explaining the Court’s consistent holding that a “person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties” (citations omitted)).
66 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215–17 (holding that the third-party doctrine did not
extend to the collection of 127 days of cell site location information).
67 See id. at 2217, 2221, 2223 (holding, narrowly, that an individual has a legitimate privacy
interest in 127 days of cell site location information held by third parties, such that obtaining
the location information from the defendant’s wireless carrier constituted a search and re-
quired a warrant).
68 Stephen E. Henderson, Carpenter v. United States and the Fourth Amendment: The
Best Way Forward, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 495, 497 (2017).
69 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. The Stored Communications Act allows the government
“to compel the disclosure of certain telecommunications records” whenever it can provide
“‘specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the
records sought ‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.’” Id. (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
70 Id. As the Court explained:
Cell phones perform their wide and growing variety of functions by
connecting to a set of radio antennas called “cell sites.” Although cell
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12,898 location points,71 showing the location of Carpenter’s phone at the time of
each incoming and outgoing call’s origination and termination.72
Using the CSLI obtained from Carpenter’s cell phone, the government was able
to create maps showing Carpenter’s proximity to the location of each of the known
robberies at the time they were committed.73 As a result of these maps and other related
testimony, Carpenter was charged with and convicted of six counts of robbery and six
counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence.74 He was ultimately
sentenced to over 100 years in prison.75
Prior to trial, Carpenter attempted to suppress the cell phone data by arguing that
the seizure of his cell site location records constituted an unlawful search, as it was
conducted without a warrant or probable cause.76 The trial court denied Carpenter’s
motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed the decision.77 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location
information collected by the government, as he had knowingly shared that information
with his wireless cell phone carriers.78 As such, the court held that the collection of
data did not constitute a search.79 The lower courts relied on the well-established third-
party doctrine to reach their holdings, reasoning that the location data could be
considered business records held by and obtained from a third-party phone company.80
The case then reached the Supreme Court, where the Justices considered whether
the government conducts a search when it accesses historical cell phone records that
provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.81 In a surprising
sites are usually mounted on a tower, they can also be found on light
posts, flagpoles, church steeples, or the sides of buildings. Cell sites
typically have several directional antennas that divide the covered area
into sectors.
Cell phones continuously scan their environment looking for the
best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site. Most
modern devices, such as smartphones, tap into the wireless network
several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner
is not using one of the phone’s features. Each time the phone connects
to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site
location information (CSLI).
Id. at 2211.
71 Id. at 2212 (the 12,898 data points collected over the period of 127 days included “an
average of 101 data points per day”).
72 Id.
73 Henderson, supra note 68, at 497.
74 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
75 Henderson, supra note 68, at 497.
76 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
77 Id. at 2212–13.
78 Id. at 2213.
79 Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 68, at 502.
80 See Henderson, supra note 68, at 502–03.
81 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
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departure from the Court’s third-party doctrine precedent, the Court held that “an
individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements as captured through CSLI.”82 The majority of the Court declined to extend
the third-party doctrine to CSLI for two key reasons: first, that the exposure of such
location data to a third-party wireless carrier is not “truly voluntary,”83 and second,
that this type of modern technology gave the government the unique ability to
“chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals.”84
The Court chose not to apply Smith and Miller to the collection of CSLI, noting
that the exposure of such location data to some third party does not itself overcome
a user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.85 The Court determined that the
voluntary exposure rationale of the third-party doctrine was ill-suited to the collec-
tion of CSLI for several reasons.86 First, they noted that cell phones have become
“‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable
to participation in modern society.”87 Second, cell phone users do not “voluntarily
‘assume[] the risk’” of turning over their location information to a third party, as
such information is automatically recorded by necessity of the operation of the cell
phone itself, unless one turns off their cell phone entirely.88 As such, the Court found
it a mischaracterization to state that a cell phone user affirmatively and willingly
chooses to give this information to a third party.89
Next, the Court expressed serious Orwellian concerns regarding the invasive
nature of such location information and the ability of a 127-day record of CSLI to
provide an all-encompassing record of a person’s whereabouts.90 Such a record
necessarily “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his
particular movements,”91 but the “privacies of life,”92 including his “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations,”93 as evidenced by his daily locations.94
For these reasons, the Court noted that the collection of digital location tracking
data over a prolonged period of time is distinct from the limited types of personal
data obtained from third parties in Smith and Miller.95 Thus, the government’s
argument that the collection of Carpenter’s data “‘turns on a garden-variety request
82 Id. at 2217.
83 Id. at 2219–20; see also Carthew, supra note 17, at 208.
84 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
85 Id. at 2220.
86 Park, supra note 27, at 12.
87 Id. (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220).
88 See id. (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220).
89 See id.
90 Carthew, supra note 17, at 210.
91 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
92 Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
93 Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)).
94 Id. at 2217.
95 See id. at 2219.
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for information from a third-party witness . . . fails to contend with the seismic shifts
in digital technology’ that include ‘the exhaustive chronicle of location information
casually collected by wireless carriers today.’”96 The Court seemingly “found itself
‘obligated . . . to ensure that the “progress of science” does not erode’” the protections
afforded to individuals by the Fourth Amendment.97 Finally, in light of the unique na-
ture of CSLI, the Supreme Court held that the government will generally be required
to obtain a warrant in order to access historical cell-site location information.98
The Court’s holding in Carpenter resulted in a new balancing test, which weighs,
on one hand, one’s reasonable expectation of privacy with, on the other, whether the
information was truly voluntarily exposed to a third party.99 However, no broadly ap-
plicable principle emerged from the Court’s opinion in Carpenter, leaving the breadth
of the Court’s holding as applied to other types of modern technology unknown.100
IV. FITBIT DEVICES AND THE POTENTIAL FOR USE OF ELECTRONIC FITNESS
TRACKERS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS
A. The Capabilities of Fitbit Devices
Fitbits are physical activity tracking devices that are worn on one’s wrist and
can measure a person’s heart rate, stress level, brain activity, respiration, and body
temperature, among other things.101 Fitbit was founded in 2007 and launched its first
fitness tracker in 2009.102 Today, Fitbit, Inc. sells four different fitness trackers and
three smartwatches, each with its own unique function, capability, and style.103
Fitbits and other fitness trackers and smart-watches have become highly popular-
ized, with 102.4 million devices sold in 2016 alone.104 Fitbit devices accounted for
almost twenty-two percent of the total devices shipped that year.105 In fact, Fitbit,
Inc. sold 22.3 million devices in 2016 and reported approximately 23.2 million
active users.106
96 Park, supra note 27, at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 2219).
97 Id. at 12 (alteration in original) (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223).
98 Id. at 5.
99 Mary-Kathryn Takeuchi, A New Third-Party Doctrine: The Telephone Metadata
Program and Carpenter v. United States, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2243, 2244 (2019).
100 Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 235 (2019).
101 Park, supra note 27, at 30.
102 Carrie Marshall & James Stables, The Story of Fitbit: How a Wooden Box Was Bought by
Google for $2.1bn, WAREABLE (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.wareable.com/fitbit/story-of-fit
bit-7936 [https://perma.cc/4QU6-2K8R].
103 See Products, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/global/us/products [http://perma.cc/H6Q6
-RKKD] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020); Home, FITBIT,http://www.fitbit.com/home [http://perma
.cc/6VT9-TZEA] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
104 Kendall, supra note 15, at 335.
105 Id. at 335–36 (“Apple made up approximately 10.5%, Garmin approximately 5.9%,
and Samsung comprised around 4.3% of the total units shipped in 2016.”).
106 Id. at 336.
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In order to use their products, Fitbit requires users to disclose their names, email
addresses, dates of birth, genders, heights, and weights.107 Fitbit also strongly recom-
mends that users provide additional information such as daily food logs, sleep habits,
water intake, and female health tracking in order to “improve [the user’s] experience
or enable certain features of the Services.”108 During use, the device collects data,
such as the number of steps the user takes, their total distance traveled each day,
calories burned, heart rate, sleep stages, and total active minutes.109 Many of these
features require use of “precise geolocation data, including GPS signals, device
sensors, Wi-Fi access points, and cell tower IDs.”110 The Fitbit privacy policy notes
that Fitbit, Inc. stores all information and data collected from use of its devices,
unless the user deletes the data from their account.111 However, it also notes that the
deletion of such data would negatively impact the device’s ability to provide the
user with personal statistics and other aspects of the services.112
B. The Potential for Use of Electronic Fitness Trackers in Criminal
Investigations and Prosecutions
The Fitbit privacy policy states:
We may preserve or disclose information about you to comply
with a law, regulation, legal process, or governmental request;
to assert legal rights or defend against legal claims; or to prevent,
detect, or investigate illegal activity, fraud, abuse, violations of
our terms, or threats to the security of the Services or the physical
safety of any person.113
Because Fitbit collects and stores users’ personal data, such data has the potential
to be used by law enforcement.114 Law enforcement officials have two potential
107 Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 10 (stating that Fitbit uses “information like your
height, weight, gender, and age” to “estimate a variety of metrics like the number of steps
you take, your distance traveled, [and] calories burned”).
108 Id. (“Based on your sleep data, we may make inferences about your sleeping patterns
and provide you with customized insights to help you improve your sleep. We may personalize
exercise and activity goals for you based on the goals you previously set and your historical
exercise or activity data.”).
109 Id.
110 Id. (“When you allow us to collect precise location information, we use that information
to provide and improve features of the Services such as recording where a workout took




114 See Henderson, supra note 68, at 510.
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interests in using Fitbit data.115 First, the government has an interest in using this
data to solve past crimes.116 Like in Carpenter where the government used 127 days
of CSLI data to prove that the defendant was near the scene of each of the robberies
during their commission, law enforcement could use the historical location informa-
tion collected by Fitbit to pinpoint a user’s location in order to prove or disprove
their proximity to a crime scene during the commission of the crime.117 The govern-
ment’s second potential interest in using Fitbit data is to prevent future crimes.118
This interest could be achieved in one of two ways.119 First, the collection of Fitbit
data could have a general deterrence effect.120 For example, if people knew that their
location was being recorded and could later be used against them in a criminal prosecu-
tion, they might be less inclined to commit a crime for fear of being caught.121 Second,
real-time surveillance of users’ data, including their locations, gives law enforce-
ment the ability to intervene and prevent crimes from occurring when they suspect
crime is afoot.122
Fitbit data is already being used by law enforcement in these ways across the
country.123 For example, in the investigation of Connie Dabate’s murder in December
2015, Connecticut law enforcement officials used the victim’s Fitbit data to reveal
the time and location of her last recorded steps.124 The data revealed that Connie
Dabate’s last movements inside her home were at approximately 10:05 a.m., about
an hour after her husband, Richard Dabate, had told law enforcement officials that
an armed intruder broke into their home and shot his wife.125 In that case, the Fitbit
data obtained by law enforcement was ultimately used to charge Richard Dabate
with the first-degree murder of his wife.126
Alternatively, Fitbit data can been used to prove that a suspect in a criminal
investigation was not responsible for the alleged crime.127 In one case, for example,
two young boys found the brutally beaten body of a woman, Nicole VanderHeyden,
and reported it to the police.128 Investigators initially suspected the woman’s live-in
115 See id.
116 Id.
117 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212–13 (2018); see also Henderson,
supra note 68, at 510.




122 Id. at 511.
123 See Kendall, supra note 15, at 337.
124 Id. at 338; Altimari, supra note 4.
125 See Altimari, supra note 4.
126 See Paiella, supra note 5.
127 See Kate Briquelet, ‘My Fitbit Proves I Didn’t Kill Her,’ DAILY BEAST (June 6, 2017,
8:50 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/my-fitbit-proves-i-didnt-kill-her [http://perma.cc
/AJ9D-R456].
128 See id.
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boyfriend for her murder, but his Fitbit data ultimately revealed that he was asleep at
home at the time of his girlfriend’s death, thereby confirming his alibi and clearing him
of any further suspicion by law enforcement.129
Finally, law enforcement officials have used Fitbit data to confirm or deny vic-
tims’ stories regarding alleged attacks.130 In one case, police used an alleged victim’s
own Fitbit data to determine that her police report, claiming that she had been forced
out of her bed and raped, was false, and that instead, she had walked around all night
staging a crime scene in her home.131 Police also used Fitbit location information to
confirm the report of a jogger who reported she was attacked in Seattle while on a
run.132 In that case, law enforcement officials used the victim’s Fitbit data to track
the route of her run, then overlaid an aerial photograph of the area to determine
where the attack occurred.133
These examples demonstrate only a few of the ways in which Fitbit data has the
potential to be used by law enforcement in criminal investigations and prosecutions.134
Experts in the field suggest that the use of Fitbit data in criminal prosecutions will
only become more popular over time.135 In fact, a state police special agent in the
high technology division suggested that such evidence “will definitely be something
in five or [ten] years, in every case, [that the police] will look to see if this informa-
tion is available.”136 Therefore, because of the popularity of Fitbit devices, the
sensitive nature of the information stored on such devices, and their potential use in
criminal investigations and prosecutions, it is necessary to determine whether the
collection of data from a Fitbit constitutes a search and, if so, whether such a search
requires a warrant.
V. ANALYSIS: IN LIGHT OF CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES, THE COLLECTION OF
FITBIT DATA BY LAW ENFORCEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A SEARCH AND
REQUIRE A WARRANT UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court’s holding in Carpenter regarding the collection of 127 days of CSLI
should be extended to govern the collection of Fitbit data so that the government’s
collection of seven or more days of Fitbit data constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment and law enforcement are required to obtain a warrant before collecting
129 See id.
130 See Kendall, supra note 15, at 337–38.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 338.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 337–38.
135 See Justin Jouvenal, Commit a Crime? Your Fitbit, Key Fob or Pacemaker Could Snitch
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such data for use in criminal investigations or prosecutions.137 The extension of
Carpenter’s holding to the collection of Fitbit data is logical in light of the Court’s
analysis that the third-party doctrine is ill-suited to the digital age.138 Such an extension
is necessary to safeguard the protections of the Fourth Amendment in the twenty-
first century. Finally, such an extension is realistic in light of the Court’s other recent
Fourth Amendment precedent.
A. Before Carpenter, the Collection of Fitbit Data by Law Enforcement Would
Not Have Constituted a Search Under the Third-Party Doctrine
Before Carpenter, the question of whether the collection of Fitbit data by law
enforcement for use in a criminal prosecution constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment would be a simple one. The answer would be a resounding ‘no,’ under
the Supreme Court’s well-established Fourth Amendment precedent, including the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the third-party doctrine.139
Because the collection of Fitbit data does not require law enforcement officials
to physically trespass into a constitutionally protected area,140 the Supreme Court
would have almost certainly relied upon the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test to determine whether the collection of such data constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment prior to its decision in Carpenter.141 Although the Court may
have determined that a Fitbit user maintains a subjective expectation that their per-
sonal health, fitness, and location data, including their steps taken, heart rate, and
calories burned, among other data, would be kept private, the Court would have likely
found this expectation was one that society is not prepared to recognize as reason-
able under the second prong of the Katz test.142
Under the third-party doctrine, the Court would have likely found that a Fitbit user
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data stored on their device.143
The Court would likely have reasoned that, much like the financial records disclosed
to the bank in United States v. Miller144 and the phone numbers disclosed to the tele-
phone company in Smith v. Maryland,145 one who wears a Fitbit device lacks a
137 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 2220–21 (2018).
138 See id. at 2216–21.
139 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
140 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
141 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
142 See id.; Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 10. The Katz test is comprised of two unique,
but related requirements: “first[,] that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
143 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
144 See 425 U.S. at 436.
145 See 442 U.S. at 742.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in such data, as they have voluntarily disclosed their
personal information to a third party, namely Fitbit, Inc.146 Holding that the individ-
ual lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court would have determined that
obtaining Fitbit data did not constitute a search.147 Thus, under the Supreme Court’s
pre-Carpenter precedent, the government would be free to obtain such information
from Fitbit, Inc. without a warrant and without violating the Fourth Amendment.148
B. In Light of Carpenter v. United States, the Collection of Fitbit Data by Law
Enforcement Should Be Considered a Search, as the Third-Party Doctrine Is
Ill-Suited to the Digital Age
While the question of whether the collection of Fitbit data constitutes a search
would previously have been easily resolved by the Katz test and the third-party doc-
trine, the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Carpenter v. United States suggests that
the third-party doctrine may no longer be the appropriate test by which to answer this
inquiry.149 Although the Court’s decision in Carpenter was limited to the collection
of the 127 days of CSLI involved in that particular case, the Court’s reasoning that
the third-party doctrine is ill-suited to modern technology is widely applicable to
numerous types of technology, including Fitbit data.150
1. Fitbit Data, like CSLI, Is Not Truly “Voluntarily” Exposed to Third Parties
In reaching the determination that the collection of CSLI constituted a search,
the Court relied on two main arguments: First, the Court reasoned that CSLI is not
truly “voluntarily exposed” to telephone companies, because disclosure of data is “in-
cidental to merely having a cell phone, an item necessary for functioning in modern
society.”151 Emphasizing the pervasiveness of cell phones in today’s world to
demonstrate the lack of choice one has in exposing such data to third parties, Justice
Sotomayor commented during the November 2017 oral arguments for Carpenter
that many people carry their cell phones with them almost 24/7, even “into their
beds and public restrooms.”152 In fact, Justice Sotomayor noted that cell phones are
“an appendage now for some people.”153
146 See id.; Takeuchi, supra note 99, at 2243.
147 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
148 See Park, supra note 27, at 5.
149 See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018).
150 See Park, supra note 27, at 28–29.
151 Id. at 1, 11–12.
152 Id. at 1; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 42–43, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(No. 16-402).
153 Park, supra note 27, at 1 (quoting Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Justices Hint at More
Digital-Privacy Protections, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017
550 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:533
If Justice Sotomayor is correct that cell phones have become indispensable to
daily functioning in modern life, then certainly the same can be said for Fitbits.154 In
fact, Fitbits “are perhaps more likely to be found on the person, as they are designed to
be worn on the body as an armband.”155 Furthermore, like the telephone companies’
automatic collection and storing of the CSLI at issue in Carpenter, Fitbit, Inc. stores its
users’ data, including their health and location information, automatically, unless the
user manually deletes the data from their account settings.156 Although one might argue
that users voluntarily disclose such data to Fitbit, Inc., a third party, when they agree to
the terms of service provided by the company in order to use their devices, it is no
secret that most users do not take the time to read the terms of service or privacy poli-
cies upon receiving their new devices.157 In fact, most people “quickly tap ‘next,’ ‘next’,
[sic] and ‘Agree,’” to the long list of small-font terms listed.158 Thus, it is hardly fair to
say that users affirmatively “opt in” to sharing their personal data with Fitbit, Inc.159
Moreover, even if a user wanted to opt out of sharing their personal data with
Fitbit, doing so would limit the functioning abilities of the device, thereby providing
a disincentive for users to opt out of sharing this information.160 Fitbit users, like cell
phone users, cannot be said to “voluntarily” expose their health and location data to
a third party through mere use of a Fitbit device.161 As such, like in Carpenter, the
“voluntary exposure” rationale of the third-party doctrine is ill-suited to the collec-
tion of Fitbit data.162
2. The Collection of Fitbit Data Constitutes a “Seismic Shift” in Technology Not
Contemplated by the Third-Party Doctrine
The Court in Carpenter reasoned that the third-party doctrine was inapplicable
to the collection of 127 days of CSLI because such a vast amount of location data
gave the government the unique ability to “chronicle a person’s past movements
-11-29/supreme-court-justices-hint-at-new-digital-privacy-protections [http://perma.cc/B26P
-LTS5] (Nov. 29, 2017, 2:57 PM)).
154 See id.
155 Katharine Saphner, Note, You Should Be Free to Talk the Talk and Walk the Walk:
Applying Riley v. California to Smart Activity Trackers, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1689, 1711 (2016)
(emphasis added).
156 See Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 10.
157 See Sophie Charara & Husain Sumra, We Read Your Wearable Tech’s Privacy Policy




160 See Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 10 (The Fitbit, Inc. privacy policy states that the
company collects and stores users’ information because such data is necessary to providing
users with personal statistics and other aspects of the services Fitbit devices offer.).
161 See generally id.
162 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
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through the record of his cell phone signals,” thereby revealing the intimate details
of one’s life.163 The same can be said for the collection of Fitbit data. In fact, Fitbit
data may be even more sensitive and revealing than CSLI alone.164 “While cell phones
are designed to communicate with the outside world, activity trackers are designed to
collect data about the way users live their lives, and then display it back to the user.”165
Fitbit tracks not just one’s approximate location based on CSLI, but also a user’s
exact locations, the number of steps taken each day, their heart rate, sleep habits, stress
level, brain activity, respiration, body temperature, food and water intake, and even
female health information.166 This kind of information provides an “intimate window
into a person’s life,” by revealing what they eat, how they sleep, where they spend
their time, and even their current state of health.167 As such, the Court’s reasoning
for declining to apply the third-party doctrine to the kind of sensitive and revealing
information at issue in Carpenter applies even more fervently to Fitbit data, as this
type of data represents just the kind of “seismic shifts in digital technology” the
Court expressed concerns about in Carpenter.168
Because the third-party doctrine should not apply to the collection of Fitbit data
and the collection of such data infringes on a user’s reasonable expectation of privacy,
it must be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. Warrantless searches
are considered per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a
few, limited exceptions.169 Thus, law enforcement should be required to obtain a
warrant before collecting a user’s Fitbit data.
C. Proposed Rule: Expanding Carpenter’s Rationale to Provide a Generally
Applicable Framework for Determining Whether the Collection of Data
Constitutes a Search
Going forward, courts should apply the Carpenter rationale to other types of
technology to determine whether the collection of such data constitutes a search and
requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. Where (1) the data contains “sensitive
information” that has the potential to reveal the “privacies of [one’s] life,”170 (2) the
163 See id. at 2216–20.
164 See Nicole Chauriye, Note, Wearable Devices as Admissible Evidence: Technology Is
Killing Our Opportunities to Lie, 24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 495, 527 (2016); Park, supra
note 27, at 30.
165 Saphner, supra note 155, at 1714.
166 See Kendall, supra note 15, at 337; Park, supra note 27, at 30; Fitbit Privacy Policy,
supra note 10.
167 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 10.
168 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219; Park, supra note 27, at 11.
169 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Whether the collection of Fitbit data
would fall within one such exception to the general warrant requirement is outside the scope
of this Note.
170 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214, 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403
(2014)).
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disclosure of such information is not truly voluntarily, but rather merely incidental
to the use of the technology itself, and (3) the use of such technology is necessary
for functioning in modern society,171 the collection of such data should constitute a
search and require a warrant.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter was limited to holding that
127 days of CSLI, which included 12,898 location points, constituted a search,172 the
Court’s reasoning suggests that the rule should not be limited to applying only to the
collection of such a lengthy period of data.173 In Carpenter, the Court noted that the
127 days of CSLI constituted a search because it provided law enforcement with a
comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.174 The 12,898 location
points obtained in Carpenter came from location transmissions providing the user’s
location at the time of the start and end of each call placed or received on his cell
phone.175
Modern, wearable technological devices, such as Fitbits, track the wearer’s location
constantly, gathering and collecting data on the user’s movements throughout the day,
even when the user is not actively using the device’s functions.176 As such, Fitbits
and other similar devices can easily collect 12,898 location points from a user in just
a matter of days, as compared to the more than four months it took to gather this
amount of data in Carpenter.177
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should adopt a rule wherein the collection
of seven or more days of one’s Fitbit data constitutes a search and requires a war-
rant.178 The quantity and specificity of the location data collected by Fitbit devices
over the course of a week is capable of revealing the same “privacies of [one’s]
life”179 as the 127 days of CSLI in Carpenter by revealing “one’s intimate relation-
ships, hobbies, predilections, medical conditions, religious beliefs, and political
pursuits”180 through their location and health data.
171 See Park, supra note 27, at 12.
172 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212, 2220.
173 See id. at 2219–20.
174 See id. at 2218–19.
175 See id. at 2211–12, 2217.
176 See Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 10 (“The Services include features that use
precise geolocation data, including GPS signals, device sensors, Wi-Fi access points, and cell
tower IDs.”).
177 See id.
178 This proposed “one week” rule should also apply to devices and technologies similar
to Fitbits in their capabilities to constantly track a user’s location even when the device is not
actively being used. The collection of one week or more of data from any such device
capable of tracking the entirety of one’s movements during a particular day should thus
constitute a search and require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.
179 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
180 Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, id. (No. 16-402) [hereinafter Scholars’ Brief].
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D. Providing a Workable Standard for Data Collection Under the Fourth
Amendment: Why Holding that the Collection of Fitbit Data Constitutes a
Search and Requires a Warrant Is Both Necessary and Realistic
Holding that the collection of Fitbit data constitutes a search and requires a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment is both necessary and realistic. As discussed
hereinafter, the proposed rule is both consistent with the Framers’ intent for the scope
of the individual protections under the Fourth Amendment and necessary in order to
protect against the dangers of an Orwellian state.181 It is also necessary in order to
provide law enforcement a bright-line rule.182 Finally, this proposed rule is realistic
in light of several practical considerations that suggest the Supreme Court’s willing-
ness to depart from the third-party doctrine.183
1. The Proposed Rule Is Consistent with the Framers’ Intent for Individual
Protections Under the Fourth Amendment
Holding that the government’s collection of an individual’s Fitbit data consti-
tutes a search is consistent with the Framers’ original intent for the scope of the
protections under the Fourth Amendment.184 The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.185
At the time the Fourth Amendment was ratified, “to ‘search’ meant to ‘examine,’
‘explore,’ ‘look through,’ ‘inquire,’ ‘seek,’ or ‘try to find.’”186 As such, although the
Framers could not have imagined that the government would be able to collect records
of one’s past location data from a device worn on one’s wrist, the collection of such
data clearly constitutes a “search” under the original definition of the word.187
Furthermore, Fitbit location data implicates the same type of expressive and
association activities that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to protect.188
181 See infra Sections V.D.1 and V.D.2.
182 See infra Section V.D.3.
183 See infra Section V.D.4.
184 See Scholars’ Brief, supra note 180, at 2.
185 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
186 Scholars’ Brief, supra note 180, at 2 (quoting SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792)).
187 See id. at 3.
188 Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Brennan Center for Justice, the
Constitution Project, National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers & National Ass’n of Federal
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By including “papers” among the other places and things protected by the Amend-
ment, the Framers clearly indicated that the Fourth Amendment’s protection was
meant to safeguard one’s personal information from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government.189 In fact, the Bill of Rights itself was created “against
the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure” could
be dangerous to one’s freedom of expression.190 Thus, the collection of Fitbit data
implicates the same type of information that the Framers intentionally set out to
protect from warrantless governmental intrusions.191
The Framers chose the language of the Fourth Amendment carefully in order to
shield against the types of invasions suffered by the Founding Fathers under Britain’s
writs of assistance.192 In fact, the Framers believed that discretionary, arbitrary, and un-
fettered governmental power was inherently “unreasonable” and “against the reason
of the common law” because of “its oppressive impact on ‘the people’ as a whole.”193
Although the Framers could not have anticipated the types of modern technological
issues the Supreme Court is faced with today, “they would have recognized the
dangers inherent in any [governmental] claim of unlimited authority to conduct
searches for evidence of criminal activity.”194 Thus, holding that the collection of
Fitbit data constitutes a search is consistent with the Framers’ intent for the extent
of the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment.
2. The Proposed Rule Is Necessary to Shield Against an “Orwellian State”
Concluding that the collection of Fitbit data constitutes a search and requires a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment is the necessary rule “to ensure that the
‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”195 Justice
Sotomayor, in her concurrence in United States v. Jones stated:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital
Defenders in Support of Petitioner at 26, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)
(No. 16-402).
189 Id.
190 Id. (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrants of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 729
(1961)).
191 See id. at 28.
192 Scholars’ Brief, supra note 180, at 3 (the writs of assistance were a type of general
warrant that allowed state agents to exercise broad discretion to search one’s property with
unbridled discretion).
193 Id. (quoting Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1181, 1270 (2016)).
194 Id. at 4.
195 Park, supra note 27, at 12 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223
(2018)).
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age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks. . . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily dis-
closed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for
that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.196
Justice Sotomayor’s concerns closely resemble the Court’s later decision in Carpen-
ter.197 Other reasons exist why the Court’s “1970s-era limited third party doctrine
should [not] apply to twenty-first century technologies,” including first and foremost
that the doctrine appears to be “contrary to prevailing theories of information
privacy.”198
To begin with, both the common law and the liberal understand-
ings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information
concerning his or her person. In an organized society, there are
few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another.
Thus the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at
common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the
allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time
rendered it private. According to Webster’s initial definition, in-
formation may be classified as “private” if it is “intended for or
restricted to the use of a particular person or group or class of
persons: not freely available to the public.”199
If a contrary rule regarding Fitbit data were adopted, allowing the government to
access, collect, and use such data at its discretion, it would seriously undermine soci-
ety’s conception of privacy and would start society down a dangerous path to an
Orwellian state.200 “In a world of truly ubiquitous connectivity where we are record-
ing our heartbeat, our steps, our location . . . if all of that data is now available to
law enforcement without a warrant . . . that’s a big invasion of what most of us think
our privacy should include.”201 In fact, as Justice Sotomayor noted, these develop-
ments, if left unchecked, will “alter the relationship between citizen and government
in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”202
196 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
197 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
198 Henderson, supra note 68, at 504.
199 Id. at 505 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 498
U.S. 749, 763 (1989)).
200 See Carthew, supra note 17, at 210.
201 Jouvenal, supra note 135 (first omission in original).
202 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
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Although some may argue that the collection of Fitbit data is necessary to ensure
the effectiveness of modern law enforcement, “[w]e cannot forgive the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment in the name of law enforcement.”203 As technology con-
tinues to advance and “seismic shifts in digital technology” become a normality, the
Court must be prepared to safeguard the protections of the Fourth Amendment more
fiercely than ever before.204
3. The Proposed Rule Is Best Suited to the Protection of Individual Rights, as
Law Enforcement Officials Need a Bright-Line Rule Regarding the Collection
of Fitbit Data
Law enforcement officials need easily applied rules regarding collection of Fitbit
data.205 In fact, the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently empha-
sized the importance of the workability of the rules law enforcement officials must
follow.206 This is because police decisions are often “quick ad hoc judgment[s].”207
In Riley, for example, the Court emphasized the need for easily applicable rules in the
context of police investigations, stating that “[i]f police are to have workable rules,
the balancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a categorical
basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.’”208 As
such, a bright-line rule requiring police to obtain a warrant before collecting Fitbit
data is best suited to safeguard individuals’ Fourth Amendment protections.
4. Several Practical Considerations Suggest the Supreme Court’s Willingness to
Depart from the Third-Party Doctrine
Finally, several practical considerations suggest that the Supreme Court may be
willing to depart from the third-party doctrine, especially in cases involving modern
technology.209 First, there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court no longer
supports the doctrine.210 The Court has not applied the doctrine in several decades,
suggesting its reluctance to reaffirm the doctrine in a modern context.211 Moreover,
none of the current Supreme Court justices were on the bench at the time the Court
last applied the third-party doctrine.212
203 GRONLUND, supra note 1, at 204.
204 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
205 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–400 (2014).
206 See Saphner, supra note 155, at 1718.
207 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
208 Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 398).




2020] FITBIT DATA AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 557
Second, recent Supreme Court precedent regarding the application of the warrant
requirement under the Fourth Amendment suggests the Court recognizes that many
of its previously well-established precedents regarding Fourth Amendment protections
may be ill-suited in application to advanced technology in the digital age.213 For ex-
ample, in Riley v. California, the Court held that the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches of
cell phones incident to arrest because of the uniquely private nature of cell phones.214
Prior to the Court’s decision in Riley, the general rule, expressed in United States
v. Robinson, was that a search of an arrestee’s person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest “require[d] no additional justification,” other than the arrest itself.215 In that
case, the search incident to arrest doctrine allowed police officers to conduct a pat-
down of arrestee Robinson.216 During the search, the officers felt an unidentified
object that later turned out to be a cigarette package in his coat pocket which they
subsequently removed and opened to find fourteen capsules of heroin.217
In Riley, the Court recognized that the search of one’s cell phone is significantly
more intrusive than “the type of brief physical search considered in Robinson.”218
The Court noted that a search of one’s cell phone, unlike the search of one’s pockets,
has the potential to reveal large quantities of personal data.219 In fact, “[m]odern cell
phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the
search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”220
The Court discussed at length the numerous ways in which cell phones differ
both quantitatively and qualitatively from other objects that might typically be found
during a search incident to an arrest, in order to explain why the search incident to
arrest doctrine is ill-suited to such modern technology.221 For example, the Court
213 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 392–93 (distinguishing cell phone searches from other searches
incident to arrest because they “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by
the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse”).
214 Id. at 386 (“Cell phones . . . place vast quantities of personal information literally in
the hands of individuals. . . . We therefore decline to extend Robinson to searches of data on
cell phones, and hold instead that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting
such a search.”).
215 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
216 Id. at 221–22.
217 Id. at 223.
218 Riley, 573 U.S. at 386. The Court in Riley expressed its strong disagreement with the
government’s assertion that the search of all data stored on a cell phone could be considered
“materially indistinguishable” from searches of physical items. Id. at 393 (quoting Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 26, id. (No. 13-132)). In fact,
the Court stated that such a claim “is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistin-
guishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but
little else justifies lumping them together.” Id.
219 Id. at 386.
220 Id. at 393.
221 Id. at 393–96.
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found the “immense storage capacity” of modern cell phones problematic under the
search incident to arrest doctrine.222 The Court noted that the search incident to arrest
doctrine was created to allow only for a narrow intrusion of privacy, as most people
cannot and do not attempt to physically carry “every piece of mail they have received
for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article
they have read.”223 Thus, a search of one’s person incident to arrest prior to the advent
of cell phones was relatively limited in its breadth.224
In contrast, the Court noted that cell phones’ large storage capacity makes it
possible for people to carry with them hundreds or even thousands of emails, photos,
videos, text messages, internet browsing histories, calendar events, and phone book
entries at all times.225 The Court expressed its concern that, taken together, this in-
formation can reveal far more information than previously possible during a search
incident to an arrest, as “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the
same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.”226
Thus, because of the large quantity of uniquely sensitive information “from the
mundane to the intimate” that is often stored on one’s cell phone, the Court in Riley
declined to apply the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
to cell phone searches.227 The Court held instead that law enforcement officers are
required to obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone incident to an arrest.228
The Court’s decision in Riley, though not readily applicable to the collection of
Fitbit data for use in criminal investigations, demonstrates the Supreme Court’s
willingness to depart from its established rules and doctrines regarding the reason-
ableness of searches under the Fourth Amendment when modern technologies are
involved.229 Riley also illustrates the Court’s recognition of the unique nature of
modern technology and the privacy interests at stake when police gain access to
large amounts of such personal data.230 In fact, the Court’s concerns regarding the
storage capacity of modern devices and the potential for the data stored on such
devices to reconstruct “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life”231 can easily be
applied to the collection of data from Fitbits, as such devices share cell phones’
ability to store intimate details related to one’s personal life.232
222 Id. at 393.
223 Id. at 393–94.
224 Id. at 393.
225 See id. at 394.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 393, 395.
228 Id. at 403.
229 See generally id.
230 See generally id.
231 See id. at 394.
232 See Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 10.
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For this reason, it is reasonable to believe that the Supreme Court, having not
applied the third-party doctrine in several decades and having since recognized other
Fourth Amendment doctrines as incompatible with modern technologies, would be
willing to extend Carpenter v. United States and find the third-party doctrine inappli-
cable to the collection of Fitbit data.233
CONCLUSION
Although Fitbit data has the potential to be extremely useful to law enforcement
officials in criminal investigations and prosecutions in the future, “[w]e cannot forgive
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the name of law enforcement.”234
Because of the popularity of Fitbit devices in our modern, technology-dependent
world, the sensitive nature of the personal location and health information stored on
these devices,235 and their potential use in criminal investigations and prosecutions,
the Court must exercise due care when considering whether the collection of such
data constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The collection of seven or more days of data from a user’s Fitbit by law en-
forcement should be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment, and should
require a warrant. The previously controlling third-party doctrine is ill-suited to the
digital age, as suggested by the Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United
States.236 Requiring law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant prior to collecting
such data both reflects the Framers’ original intentions for the protections afforded
to individuals by the Fourth Amendment, and “ensure[s] that the ‘progress of science’
does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”237 Furthermore, a bright-line, categori-
cal warrant rule governing the collection of Fitbit data is necessary to safeguard
individuals’ Fourth Amendment protections, as decisions by law enforcement officers
are often made using “quick ad hoc judgments.”238 Finally, the Court’s recent
willingness to depart from previously well-established Fourth Amendment doctrines
when it encounters “seismic shifts in digital technology,” reflects the Court’s rec-
ognition of the unique nature of modern technology and its need for differing
treatment under the law.239
For these reasons, the collection of seven or more days of Fitbit data by law
enforcement should not be analyzed under the third-party doctrine. Instead, the
Court should extend Carpenter’s holding to apply to the collection of Fitbit data, as
233 See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018); Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
234 GRONLUND, supra note 1, at 204.
235 See Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 10.
236 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–20.
237 Park, supra note 27, at 12 (quoting id. at 2223).
238 Saphner, supra note 155, at 1718 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235 (1973)).
239 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
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well as other sensitive, personal, and location-based technology, and should require
police to obtain a warrant before collecting more than one week’s worth of such
data, as such a span of sensitive information has the dangerous potential to reveal the
intimate details of one’s life.240 In the future, the Court should analyze new technolo-
gies under the Carpenter rationale to determine whether the collection of data from
such devices constitutes a search.241 Where (1) the data contains “sensitive informa-
tion” that has the potential to reveal the “privacies of [one’s] life,”242 (2) the disclosure
of such data is not truly voluntary, but rather merely incidental to the use of the tech-
nology itself, and (3) the use of such technology is necessary for functioning in modern
society,243 the collection of data should constitute a search and require a warrant.
240 See id. at 2220.
241 See generally id.
242 Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
243 Park, supra note 27, at 12.
